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In this article, I discuss the connections between social work practice and interpretive approaches 
to knowledge building, introduce and situate hermeneutic phenomenology for novice social work 
researchers, and explore the fit between hermeneutic phenomenology and social work. In this 
paper, I also present a historical, methodological, and philosophical overview of the roots of 
hermeneutic/interpretive phenomenology from Augustine to Sartre. I advocate for the congru-
ence between an hermeneutic approach and social work research due to its focus on inquiry as 
application, emphasis on the situated nature of human experiences, concept of attention to the 
unspoken or undisclosed, idea of the hermeneutic circle as a link between individual experiences 






hermeneutics, interpretation, phenomenology, social work
Social work is interpretive and so emerges 
its affinity to hermeneutics and interpretive 
approaches to knowledge building such as 
hermeneutic phenomenology. In this article, 
I discuss the connections between social 
work practice and interpretive approaches to 
knowledge building, introduce and situate 
hermeneutic phenomenology for novice so-
cial work researchers, and explore the fit 
between hermeneutic phenomenology and 




Social Work and Interpretive Approaches 
to Knowledge 
 
Interpretive inquiry is highly consistent with 
social work due to its inclusion of concepts 
of (situated) agency, closeness to subjects 
(with subjects understood as human actors), 
and a critical inter-subjectivity that seeks to 
disrupt oppressive social discourses through 
a hermeneutic understanding that connects 
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private troubles to public issues. With an 
ontological orientation that embraces truths 
over Truth, and an epistemological approach 
emphasizing understanding and description 
over prediction and control (Laverty, 2003), 
interpretive approaches allow social workers 
to appreciate human experiences in all their 
situated richness, without being compelled 
to make universal claims about the generali-
zability of findings. It is the relational, re-
flexive, artistic aspects of interpretative re-
search that allow the depth and nuances of 
human experiences and social work inter-
ventions to really shine. 
 
Human beings are subjects rather than 
objects and this existence of human agency 
means that there can be no absolute laws of 
human experience and behavior, as may be 
sought of phenomena in the natural sciences. 
While powerful external forces may exert 
themselves upon human subjects, the exis-
tential recourse to choice is ever-present, 
and subjects can and will respond to their 
environments in new and creative ways. 
Heidegger conceptualized this post-
structural understanding of choice as situat-
ed freedom, whereby human beings exercise 
free will in the context of their political, so-
cial, and cultural realities (Lopez & Willis, 
2002). While recognizing factors that may 
influence human behavior, the social scienc-
es must not follow the natural sciences in the 
pursuit of Truth, generalizable to all times, 
places, and peoples. So critical is the belief 
in agency that, without it, the only role for 
social work would be at the macro level.  
Social work is itself a constructed (and con-
tested) activity (Payne, 2005), in which 
practitioners move back and forth between 
the macro and the micro. Despite its focus 
on structural issues (Mullaly, 1997), social 
work is at the same time deeply concerned 
with the most intimate of human experiences.   
 
Each encounter with a client (whether 
the client is an individual, a family, a com-
munity, or a classroom) is a new experience. 
In the context of working with individuals, 
in particular, failure to experience this new-
ness with each new encounter alienates the 
social worker from the client, to whom the 
experience is profoundly personal. At the 
same time, an experienced social worker 
draws from the experiences of others like 
the client to break down walls of shame, 
loneliness, and hopelessness, and in doing so, 
situates the client’s own story in an ever-
expanding web of human concerns. Social 
workers attend to each individual’s experi-
ences, in order to honor the newness of the 
narrative.  After understanding the clients’ 
narratives on their own terms (the idiograph-
ic), the social worker can reflect upon and 
share with the client knowledge that may be 
useful to the client’s own healing, and in 
particular that which connects private trou-
bles to public issues, thereby reducing feel-
ings of self-blame and isolation. The social 
worker is changed by each such encounter, 
entering the hermeneutic circle, and bringing 
new pre-understandings to each situation. In 
social work research, the social work re-
searcher’s own prejudices (professional, ex-
periential, and scholarly) facilitate under-
standing of how to apply an interpretation; 
in-depth knowledge of the social work field 
and social work education allow for sugges-
tion of more specific and meaningful appli-
cations. 
 
In the following section, I introduce 
hermeneutic phenomenology in its historical, 
methodological, and philosophical context. 
This description is intended for novice social 
work researchers considering interpretive 
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Phenomenology, a philosophical approach 
to studying human experience, is oriented 
toward understanding the essence of the 
lived experience of a phenomenon (Creswell, 
2007; Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009; van 
Manen, 1990). Phenomenology has its roots 
in the Greek words phaenesthai and logos 
(Gearing, 2004; Moustakas, 1994). 
Phaenesthai means “to flare up, to show it-
self, to appear” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 26); 
logos is reason. Thus, the phenomenon is 
what appears in consciousness (Gearing, 
2004; Moran, 2000; Moustakas, 1994; van 
Manen, 1990), and phenomenology is the 
reasoned study of what appears (Gearing, 
2004). 
 
Hermeneutic and transcendental  
phenomenology. Hermeneutic phenome-
nology is epistemologically and methodo-
logically distinct from transcendental phe-
nomenology, a theme I will return to later in 
this paper. To categorize the two traditions 
at a very superficial level, hermeneutic phe-
nomenology is used to interpret the meaning 
of lived experiences and communicate the 
interpretation textually or symbolically, 
while transcendental phenomenology is 
based on discovering the objective universal 
essences of lived experiences and communi-
cating them through pure description (Beyer, 
2011, Creswell, 2007; van Manen, 1990).  
  
Hermeneutic Phenomenology’s  
Forefathers: A Brief History From  
Augustine to Sartre 
 
Hermeneutics is the tradition, theory, phi-
losophy, and practice of interpretation 
(Moules, 2002; Smith et al., 2009). Herme-
neutic phenomenology, then, has its roots in 
both hermeneutics and phenomenology. 
Therefore, to articulate hermeneutic phe-
nomenology’s historical, philosophical, and 
methodological underpinnings, it is neces-
sary to present the contributions of both 
hermeneutic and phenomenological thinkers. 
The hermeneutic and phenomenological pro-
jects have long and complex histories, mak-
ing it difficult to identify their starting points. 
The word phenomenology first appeared in 
philosophical writing in the eighteenth cen-
tury (Moustakas, 1994, p. 26), and herme-
neutics was introduced in theology in the 
seventeenth century (Moules, 2002). 
 
Given the scope of this paper and the 
need to balance breadth with depth, I have 
elected to start with Augustine and end with 
Sartre in the twentieth century. The inclu-
sion of these founding influences relies on 
Moules’s (2002) presentation of the “ances-
tral” roots of hermeneutic inquiry; my deci-
sion to include Sartre is informed by Smith 
et al. (2009).   
 
Aurelius Augustine, 354-430. The 
fourth/fifth-century Christian bishop, theo-
logian, and philosopher Aurelius Augustine 
had a profound effect on both Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology and Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics (Grondin, 
1991/1994). His work formed the theoretical 
basis for conceptions of the limits of lan-
guage to express the inner world, the forget-
fulness of language, and the relationship be-
tween language and tradition (Grondin, 
1991/1994; Moules, 2002). 
 
The limits of language. According to 
Grondin’s (1991/1994) analysis of Augus-
tine, the inner world, or “language of the 
heart” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 35) can nev-
er be fully expressed through language; 
“something more still to be said to in order 
to comprehend the matter fully” always re-
mains (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 37). Grondin 
explained Augustine’s assertion that this is 
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because our means of communication have 
“something contingent or material about 
them” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 37). There-
fore, our inner worlds of experience can on-
ly be expressed imperfectly. An excessive 
focus on the propositional component of 
language contributes to this incomplete ex-
pression; for Augustine, only through “em-
beddedness in dialogue” (Grondin, 
1991/1994, p. 37) can language come closer 
to expressing our inner worlds. The power 
of the dialogical process is a concept devel-
oped further by Gadamer in the twentieth 
century. 
 
Phenomenology’s primary focus is on 
subjective, first-person experience; therefore, 
it is not surprising that later proponents of 
the phenomenological project took up lan-
guage’s limitations for revealing the inner 
world. Augustine’s work had a dual influ-
ence on later hermeneutic scholars - drawing 
upon Augustine, it became a “universal 
claim of hermeneutics that one can never 
say all that lies in inner speech” (Moules, 
2002, p. 4), but it was also recognized that 
“language is an instrument that mediates our 
relation to the world and to other minds” 
(Mendelson, 2010, p. 33).  
 
Language and tradition. Augustine’s 
deliberations on language included medita-
tions on its nominalistic nature in the Greek 
tradition, whereby language, and proposi-
tional language in particular, has a singular 
and technical meaning and is therefore for-
getful of itself (Grondin, 1991/1994).  The 
relationship between language and tradition, 
and the tradition that is carried within lan-
guage, is a hermeneutic theme later picked 
up by Gadamer, who credited Augustine’s 
theological reflections in shaping his under-
standing (Grondin, 1991/1994). 
 
Martin Luther, 1483-1546. The devel-
opment of hermeneutics occurred alongside 
the rise of Protestantism (Grondin, 
1991/1994; Moules, 2002). German theolo-
gian Martin Luther had significant influence 
on the history of Protestantism and the 
Christian church and on the history of ideas 
more generally (Grondin, 1991/1994). Alt-
hough Luther’s initiatives to reform the 
church “laid the basis for a hermeneutic rev-
olution . . . one might modestly inquire 
whether Luther himself really developed a 
hermeneutic theory” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 
40). Luther’s sole professorial interest was 
scriptural exegesis, and he rejected philoso-
phy as an empty scholastic pursuit (Grondin, 
1991/1994; Moules, 2002). Luther adhered 
to the principle of sola scriptura - that is, the 
meaning of scripture, when read with faith 
and revealed through God’s grace, is self-
evident - and “wielded [the principle of sola 
scriptura] against tradition and the Church’s 
magisterial establishment” (Grondin, 
1991/1994, p. 40). Luther’s most significant 
contribution to hermeneutics may have been 
the rejection of authority and tradition as the 
sole arbiters of (scriptural) meaning; four 
centuries later, in the twentieth century, 
Gadamer returned to the idea of tradition 
and interpretation.  
 
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleierma-
cher, 1768-1834. The German theologian 
and philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher 
has been credited as “one of the first to write 
systematically about hermeneutics as a ge-
neric form” (Smith et. al, 2009, p. 22) and as 
“the father of contemporary hermeneutics” 
(Moules, 2002, p. 4). He advanced an under-
standing of interpretation that included: the 
goal of determining the meaning of a text 
through reconstructing the intention and per-
spective of the author (and the possibility of 
understanding the author’s meaning better 
than he understood it himself), methods of 
grammatical and technical interpretation, a 
distinction between laxer and stricter prac-
tices of interpretation and a belief in misun-
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derstanding as the natural state from which 
interpretation proceeds, and clear identifica-
tion of the relationship between the part and 
the whole (Grondin, 1991/1994; Moules, 
2002; Smith et al., 2009).   
 
Reconstructed meaning. Schleiermacher 
articulated the ideal outcome of interpreta-
tion of a text as a true reconstruction of the 
author’s intended meaning - “what we are 
looking for is the very thought that the 
speaker wanted to express” (Schleiermacher, 
1809-1810, as cited in Grondin, 1991/1994, 
p. 68). Therefore, the best interpretation of a 
text is not that text’s meaning for the inter-
preter but rather the reconstructed meaning 
of the text from the perspective of the author 
- achieved in its ideal form in an understand-
ing of the author’s meaning that is superior 
to the author’s own. Schleiermacher under-
stood this to be an infinite task, as Grondin 
(1991/1994) described: “the goal of under-
standing better, conceived in terms of an un-
reachable telos and the impossibility of 
complete understanding, bears witness to the 
fact that the endeavor to interpret more 
deeply is always worthwhile” (p. 71). 
 
Grammatical and technical interpreta-
tion. For Schleiermacher, grammatical in-
terpretation involved finding the precise ob-
jective meaning of a text (as constituted by 
linguistic syntax), while technical (or psy-
chological) interpretation addressed the spe-
cial art employed by the author within the 
parameters of his linguistic tradition (Gron-
din, 1991/1994). Grammatical interpretation 
was therefore focused on the supra-
individual linguistic patterns that shaped the 
text’s meaning, while technical interpreta-
tion was focused on the individuality of the 
text’s author (Smith et al., 2009). 
 
Stricter and laxer interpretation and 
misunderstanding as the natural state. 
Schleiermacher differentiated between two 
purposes and methods of interpretation - the 
laxer practice, which he associated with 
clarifying areas of textual misunderstanding 
(e.g., illuminating obscure scriptural passag-
es), and the stricter practice, which assumed 
misunderstanding as the normal starting 
point against which a rigorous hermeneutics 
would guard at every turn (Grondin, 
1991/1994). Schleiermacher’s assertion of 
misunderstanding, rather than understanding, 
as the natural state was one of his greatest 
contributions to the hermeneutic project. 
Calling on the interpreter to question his 
own self-evident understandings at every 
stage to some degree foreshadowed Hus-
serl’s phenomenological attitude (although 
Husserl was concerned not with the author’s 
intended meaning in a text but with letting 
objects and phenomena appear as they really 
are, untainted by the natural attitude). 
 
Wilhelm Dilthey, 1833-1911. Wilhelm 
Dilthey, a German historian and philosopher, 
began his study of hermeneutics after 
Schleiermacher’s student, August Bockh, 
introduced him to Schleiermacher’s work 
(Moules, 2002). Dilthey’s conception of the 
human sciences as epistemologically and 
methodically distinct from the natural sci-
ences and his advancement of lived experi-
ence as the basis for all understanding set 
the groundwork for the emergence of phe-
nomenology.  
 
The natural versus the human sciences. 
Dilthey advanced an epistemological and 
methodological distinction between the nat-
ural and human sciences (Makkreel, 2012). 
The purpose of the natural sciences is expla-
nation based on natural laws, Dilthey assert-
ed, while the purpose of the human sciences 
(the social sciences and humanities) is to 
develop an understanding of the meaning of 
history and human life (Makkreel, 2012). 
The human sciences involve analysis of “the 
more complex networks of the historical 
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world and the actual givens of human beings” 
(Makkreel, 2012, p. 10) rather than the arti-
ficial abstraction of mechanistic reality un-
dertaken in the natural sciences; therefore, 
the laws discovered in the human sciences 
will always be partial and situated - that is, 
the laws “will apply not to history in general, 
but to specific cultural systems or social or-
ganizations only” (Makkreel, 2012, p. 10). 
Dilthey sought to “conceptualize the human 
sciences as autonomous sciences and defend 
them from the encroachments of natural sci-
ence and its methodology” (Grondin, 
1991/1994, p. 84). 
 
Lived experiences. Dilthey’s focus on 
lived experiences was a central element of 
his philosophy (Makkreel, 2012). In his 
view, lived experiences constituted self-
given reality involving thinking, feeling, and 
willing (Makkreel, 2012), that is, the facts of 
consciousness (Grondin, 1991/1994). In or-
der for the human sciences to extend 
knowledge beyond our own individual un-
derstandings, they “must be rooted in the 
original fullness and richness of our lived 
experience” (Makkreel, 2012, p. 12). 
Dilthey’s conceptualization of lived experi-
enced formed the basis for the later devel-
opment of phenomenology. 
 
Edmund Husserl, 1859-1938. 
 
Transcendental phenomenology. The 
German mathematician and philosopher 
Edmund Husserl has been credited as “the 
principal founder of phenomenology” (Bey-
er, 2011, p. 1).  Husserl developed transcen-
dental phenomenology, an approach to un-
derstanding human experience that “has us 
focus on the essential structures that allow 
the objects naively taken for granted in the 
‘natural attitude’ (which is characteristic of 
both our everyday life and ordinary science) 
to ‘constitute themselves’ in consciousness” 
(Beyer, 2011, p. 3). Transcendental phe-
nomenology, meant to be a “rigorous sci-
ence,” was Husserl’s response to science’s 
neglect of the “specifically human questions” 
(Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 7). Understanding 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology 
requires an appreciation of his theories about 
the life-world, the intentionality of con-
sciousness, the natural and phenomenologi-
cal attitudes, eidetic reduction, phenomeno-
logical reduction, and intersubjectivity, each 
of which I will discuss briefly in turn.  
 
Husserl, who converted to Protestantism 
in adulthood, was the son of non-Orthodox 
Jews. He was persecuted in Nazi Germany, 
losing his professorship and access to the 
university library (Zahavi, 2003). More than 
40,000 pages of Husserl’s manuscripts were 
rescued and removed from Germany by 
Franciscan Herman Leo Van Breda after 
Husserl’s death in 1938 (Beyer, 2011; Zaha-
vi, 2003). Unfortunately, almost the entire 
first printing of a posthumously published 
work was destroyed (Zahavi, 2003). 
 
The life-world. The life-world, or Le-
benswelt, as originally conceptualized by 
Husserl, is the pre-reflective, pre-theoretical 
world of everyday experience, and it is this 
world of immediate lived experience that is 
the focus of his transcendental phenomenol-
ogy (van Manen, 1990). The life-world is 
prescientific, and therefore stands in contrast 
to the scientific world: 
 
In our prescientific experience, the world 
is given concretely, sensuously, and in-
tuitively. In contrast, the scientific world 
is a system of idealities that in principle 
transcend sensuous experience. Whereas 
the lifeworld is a world of situated, rela-
tive truths, science seeks to realize an 
idea about strict and objective 
knowledge that is freed from every rela-
tion to the subjective first-person per-
spective. Whereas the objects in the 
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lifeworld are characterized by their rela-
tive, approximate, and proximal 
givenness . . . the objects of science are 
characterized as relative, nonperspectival, 
univocal, and exact. (Zahavi, 2003, pp. 
126–127) 
 
The life-world, as the world of subjec-
tive human experience, forms the foundation 
for scientific ways of knowing (Encyclope-
dia Britannica, 2012). Husserl’s transcen-
dental phenomenology advanced the life-
world as a legitimate focus for scientific in-
quiry.  
 
The intentional nature of conscious-
ness. Husserl wrote that all consciousness is 
directed, whether to real or unreal objects in 
the world (Gubrium & Holstein, 2000; Za-
havi, 2003), with the exception of non-
intentional “units of consciousness” such as 
pain (Beyer, 2011). Intentional conscious-
ness is always attached to an object in the 
world: “Perception, thought, judgment, fan-
tasy, doubt, expectation, or recollection, all 
of these diverse forms of consciousness are 
characterized by intending objects . . . the 
perceived, doubted, expected object” (Zaha-
vi, 2003, p. 14). Husserl therefore asserted 
that to understand the nature of conscious-
ness we must also analyze the object to 
which consciousness is directed (Zahavi, 
2003). For example, considering the fantasy 
of a unicorn, we cannot fully understand the 
form of consciousness that is “fantasy of a 
unicorn” without analyzing the intended ob-
ject - that is, the essence (or the horizons) of 
the unicorn (i.e., a unicorn is an imaginary 
animal; the unicorn is like a horse while not 
being a horse, etc.). The objects to which 
consciousness is directed are transcendent - 
more than the “perspectival and horizontal 
givenness of the object” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 
95) as perceived or imagined by the subject. 
Zahavi (2003) gives the chair as an example 
- one cannot view the chair from the front 
and back simultaneously, but nonetheless 
the chair’s horizons include all of the possi-
ble appearances of the chair. The idea of 
perspectival and transcendent horizons is 
important in the development of the herme-
neutic phenomenological project and must 
be considered an important influence on 
Gadamer’s later theory on the fusion of ho-
rizons. 
 
The natural and phenomenological at-
titudes. The natural attitude is associated 
with everyday experience (Smith et al., 
2009). The natural attitude includes many 
features of our everyday internal worlds, 
such as our preconceptions, assumptions, 
constructions, internal beliefs, ego experi-
ences, biases, culture, and judgments (Gear-
ing, 2004); and our “practical concerns, folk 
assumptions, and smattering of scientific 
knowledge” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 11). Husserl’s 
goal was to transcend the “naivety and falla-
cy of the natural attitude and to move, em-
ploying the classic Greek dichotomy, from a 
naive doxa to an episteme, to philosophy as 
a ‘rigorous science’” (Luft, 1998). The phe-
nomenological attitude involves a disen-
gagement from the natural attitude and a re-
flexive turn “as we turn our gaze from . . . 
objects in the world, and direct it inward, 
toward our perception of those objects” 
(Smith et. al., 2009). Husserl asserted that in 
order to objectively analyze the structure 
and content of consciousness, we must sus-
pend the natural attitude; he developed ei-
detic and phenomenological reduction to 
support this “alteration of viewpoint” (Za-
havi, 2003, p. 11). 
 
Eidetic reduction. Eidetic reduction is 
an analysis aimed at elucidating the essential 
properties of an object or experience, those 
essences without which the object or experi-
ence would become something other than 
the object or experience it is (Zahavi, 2003). 
For example, what are the essential qualities 
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that make a tree a tree, rather than a different 
type of organism altogether?  Eidetic reduc-
tion is intended to uncover the “invariant 
properties” that transcend the “subjective 
perception of individual manifestations of 
that type of object” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 
14).  As a case in point, if I see a white tree, 
does that mean that to be a tree means to be 
white? Or is whiteness a non-essential vari-
ant of being a tree - that is, a subjective per-
ception of an individual manifestation of 
being a tree?  
 
Phenomenological reduction. Phenom-
enological reduction involves the temporary 
suspension of preconceptions regarding the 
phenomena under study and is perhaps the 
most controversial facet of Husserl’s phe-
nomenology. This suspension of presupposi-
tions, called the phenomenological epoche, 
facilitates “seeing things as they appear . . . 
returning to the things themselves” 
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 90). Phenomenological 
reduction is achieved through “bracketing” 
the “taken-for-granted world” (Smith et. al, 
2009, p. 15) in order to study the essences of 
phenomena (Creswell, 2007). Bracketing is 
a mathematical idea, in which bracketed 
content within an equation is treated sepa-
rately (Smith et. al., 2009); bracketing in 
phenomenology means to treat the natural 
attitude towards an object or experience sep-
arately from the phenomenological analysis 
so that the phenomenon can reveal itself 
“free of prejudgments and preconceptions” 
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 90). Subsequent phi-
losophers such as Heidegger and Gadamer 
challenged the feasibility and desirability of 
bracketing in phenomenological inquiry. 
 
Intersubjectivity. Husserl articulated a 
complex theoretical model of intersubjec-
tivity. Husserl’s conceptualization of inter-
subjectivity was embodied, experiential, and 
constitutive (Zahavi, 2003). According to 
Husserl, it is through our own embodied 
subjectivity that we are able to recognize 
another’s embodied subjectivity - as Zahavi 
stated in his analysis of Husserl, “it is exact-
ly the unique subject-object status of my 
body that permits me to recognize another 
body as a foreign embodied subjectivity” (p. 
113). Additionally, according to Zahavi’s 
interpretation of Husserl, we each under-
stand the Other experientially and without 
access to the other person’s first-person sub-
jectivity: “had I the same access to the con-
sciousness of the Other as I have to my own, 
the Other would have ceased being an Other 
and instead have become a part of myself” 
(Zahavi, 2003, p. 114). This point is critical 
to Husserl’s theory of constituting intersub-
jectivity; the transcendent world (i.e., the 
objective world) is only made available 
through intersubjectivity - that is:  
 
objects cannot be reduced to being mere-
ly my intentional correlates if they can 
be experienced by others as well. The in-
tersubjective experienceability of the ob-
ject guarantees its real transcendence, so 
my experience (constitution) of trans-
cendent objects is necessarily mediated 
by my experience of its givenness for 
another transcendent subject, that is, by 
my experience of a foreign world-
directed subject. (Grondin, 1991/1994, 
pp. 115–116) 
 
Husserl’s student Heidegger also takes up 
intersubjectivity later in the phenomenologi-
cal project. 
 
Martin Heidegger, 1889-1976. German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger was a student 
of Husserl’s who aimed to extend the phe-
nomenological project - “Heidegger’s ap-
proach to phenomenology is often taken to 
mark the move away from the transcenden-
tal project, and to set out the beginnings of 
the hermeneutic and existential emphases in 
phenomenological philosophy” (Smith et al., 
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2009, p. 16). Heidegger acknowledged Hus-
serl as a formative intellectual influence 
(Smith et al., 2009), while Husserl eventual-
ly publicly repudiated Heidegger’s phenom-
enology, even referring to him as his anti-
pode (Beyer, 2011). Key facets of 
Heidegger’s phenomenology included an 
interpretive stance, a focus on being-in-the-
world (Dasein), the hermeneutic circle, visi-
ble and hidden meanings, and, later in his 
philosophical career, the role of language-
each of which I will discuss in turn. 
Heidegger’s involvement with National So-
cialism cannot be overlooked in phenome-
nology’s historical context, and so I will 
deal briefly with this significant shadow on 
the phenomenological project as well. 
 
Interpretive stance. While Husserl envi-
sioned a phenomenology that would trans-
cend the natural attitude of everyday life, 
including our prejudgments about phenome-
na, Heidegger “questioned the possibility of 
any knowledge outside of an interpretive 
stance, whilst grounding this stance in the 
lived world-the world of things, people, rela-
tionships and language” (Smith et al., 2009, 
p. 16). For Heidegger, one’s fore-
conceptions, consisting of “prior experienc-
es, assumptions, [and] preconceptions” 
(Smith et al, 2009, p. 25) are brought to each 
new encounter. Simultaneously extending 
and challenging Husserl’s advancement of 
intentional consciousness, Heidegger reject-
ed the possibility of pure reflection because 
reflection, as a form of consciousness, is 
“intentional, and therefore never completely 
separated from the world” (LeVasseur, 2003, 
p. 414). 
 
Dasein. Husserl’s transcendental phe-
nomenology was primarily focused on what 
can be:  
 
broadly classified as individual psycho-
logical processes, such as perception, 
awareness and consciousness.  In con-
trast, Heidegger is more concerned with 
the ontological question of existence it-
self, and with the practical activities and 
relationships which we are caught up in, 
and through which the world appears to 
us, and is made meaningful. (Smith et al., 
2009, pp. 16-17) 
 
Therefore, Heidegger’s philosophy re-
vived  “the ontology of the subject” (Moules, 
2002, p. 7). The subject of Heidegger’s life 
work, Being and Time (1962/1927) is 
“there-being” (Dasein), where Dasein is the 
“uniquely situated” quality of ‘human being’” 
(Smith et al., 2009, p. 16). Heidegger assert-
ed that Dasein is fundamentally relational 
(intersubjective) - Dasein is being-with 
(Smith et al, 2009). Even being alone is be-
ing-with, albeit in a deficient way (Smith et 
al., 2009). Heidegger viewed death, and the 
resulting finiteness and uncertainty of being, 
as giving Dasein a temporal dimension 
(Smith et al., 2009). Although Dasein is 
fundamentally being-with, death is signifi-
cant in that it is faced alone (Smith et al., 
2009).   
 
The nature of Dasein presented a fun-
damental challenge to Husserl’s presupposi-
tionless phenomenological project-with Da-
sein involving “the inherently social being 
who already operates with a pre-theoretical 
grasp of the a priori structures that make 
possible particular modes of Being” 
(Wheeler, 2011, p. 7). In opposition to Hus-
serl’s conception of the phenomenological 
reduction and the phenomenological epoche, 
Heideggerian philosophy maintains that giv-
en the nature of our Dasein, “we are unable 
to completely bracket prior conceptions and 
knowledge - we are necessarily embedded in 
a historical context” (LeVasseur, 2003, p. 
415). In Heideggerian phenomenology, 
bracketing is considered a specious project 
(LeVasseur, 2003). Heidegger further devel-
Newberry  Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 2012 Article 14    10 
oped his theory on the role of pre-
understanding (fore-conceptions) in his for-
mulation of the hermeneutic circle. 
 
Hermeneutic circle. The idea of the 
hermeneutic circle did not originate with 
Heidegger, but it took on new meaning in 
his philosophy. Whereas the hermeneutic 
circle was previously conceptualized in 
terms of the relationship between the whole 
of a text and its parts, or between text and 
tradition, with Heidegger the hermeneutic 
circle becomes an “existential task with 
which each of us is confronted” (Ramberg & 
Gjesdal, 2009, p. 15). The hermeneutic cir-
cle involves an ever-increasing development 
of understanding as we revise our pre-
understandings in light of new experiences: 
 
In the hermeneutic circle, we make pro-
gress toward sense and meaning by 
questioning prior knowledge, thus ex-
panding into new horizons of meanings. 
Yet, we never fully arrive, because to ar-
rive would merely represent another 
stage of pre-understanding.  Instead, 
each turn in the circle opens new hori-
zons and possibilities yet resists dogmat-
ic conclusions, because the ongoing pro-
ject of reflective questions keeps the 
possibility of new experiences and pos-
sibilities alive. (LeVasseur, 2003, p. 
418) 
 
According to Heidegger, our fore-
conceptions are necessary prerequisites to 
new understanding; all interpretations (and 
all understanding involves interpretation) 
flow from our presuppositions.  
 
Appearance-the visible and the hidden. 
Heidegger was interested in what it means 
for a phenomenon to appear-as explained by 
Smith et al. (2009): “to say something ap-
pears suggests that it is entering a new state, 
as it is coming forth, presenting itself to us -
and in contrast to a previous state, where it 
was not present” (p. 24). This is clearly con-
nected to Heidegger’s interpretive stance 
and rejection of a presuppositionless phe-
nomenology; this viewpoint on appearance 
suggests we cannot view phenomena objec-
tively, because every time we view a phe-
nomenon it appears anew. Heidegger was 
also interested in what is not made visible in 
the appearance of phenomena - what is hid-
den or concealed (Smith et al., 2009). There-
fore, for Heidegger, phenomenological in-
vestigation must consider both the manifest 
and the latent qualities of phenomena as 
they are revealed (Smith et al., 2009). This 
idea has had important implications for her-
meneutic phenomenology, and suggests, for 
example, that phenomenologists studying 
accounts of human experience must be alert 
to both what is being said and what is not 
being said about an experience. This is in 
contrast to Husserl’s approach, in which the 
phenomenologist suspends the natural atti-
tude and tries to see only what an object or 
phenomenon really is. A phenomenologist 
cannot identify what is not being revealed 
without recourse to his or her fore-
conceptions - further differentiating 
Heidegger’s interest in the latent content of 
appearances from a Husserlian approach. 
 
Language. Grondin (1991/1994) ob-
served a conscious movement in 
Heidegger’s work towards the importance of 
language in being. In his later work, 
Heidegger speaks more empathically of lan-
guage as the “house of being,” yet his be-
liefs about the limits of language remain 
(Grondin, 1991/1994). Reminiscent of Au-
gustine, Heidegger argued in the final words 
of the lecture considered to mark the end 
point of his thought: 
 
it is inescapably necessary to overcome 
the obstacles which make such a saying 
[of experience] obviously inadequate. 
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Even the saying that occurs in the form 
of lecture remains an obstacle of this 
kind. Its saying has been only in proposi-
tions. (Heidegger, 1969, as cited in 
Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 102) 
 
While Heidegger gives increasing credence 
to the role of language in being, he also ech-
oes Augustine’s assertion that language is 
always an inadequate interpretation of inner 
experience. The importance of language in 
the hermeneutic phenomenological project is 
developed more deeply in Gadamerian phi-
losophy. 
 
Heidegger and National Socialism. Ac-
counts of Heidegger’s philosophical work 
sometimes make mention of his Nazi affilia-
tions and sometimes do not. While some 
scholars present his philosophical ideas 
without reference to his Nazi involvement, 
others believe his political activities were 
intimately tied to his philosophical project: 
 
Everyone-great thinkers included-is ca-
pable of errors of political judgment, 
even egregious ones. However, the more 
one learns about the Heidegger/National 
Socialism nexus, the more one is ineluc-
tably driven to conclude the philosopher 
himself perceived his Nazi involvements 
not as a random course of action, but as 
a logical outgrowth of his philosophical 
doctrines. . . . as a concrete exemplifica-
tion of eigentliches Dasein or authentic 
existence.” (Wolin, 1988, p. 136) 
 
While Heidegger has been alternately 
held accountable and exonerated by scholars, 
the nature and meaning of his Nazi in-
volvement remains controversial, especially 
as it relates to his philosophy. It is fairly 
well accepted that he was a member of the 
National Socialist Party during his rector-
ship at Freiburg University-during which 
time he gave pro-Nazi speeches, eliminated 
democratic structures within the university, 
and initiated an end to financial aid for Jew-
ish students (Peters, 2009). After the war, 
Heidegger was investigated by the denazifi-
cation committee at Freiburg University and 
banned from teaching until 1949; in 1950 he 
was made professor emeritus (Wheeler, 
2011). Scholarly attempts to exonerate 
Heidegger have been challenged by the ab-
sence of any clear and complete repudiation 
of National Socialism in his later works 
(Wheeler, 2011). Heidegger’s Nazi in-
volvement cast a shadow over more than 
Heideggerian phenomenology, tainting the 
phenomenological project more generally 
(c.f. Holmes, 1996). How are we to under-
stand Heideggerian phenomenology in light 
of Heidegger’s National Socialist activities?  
Wheeler (2011) suggested: 
 
It would be irresponsible to ignore the 
relationship between Heidegger’s phi-
losophy and his politics. But it is surely 
possible to be critically engaged in a 
deep and intellectually stimulating way 
with his sustained investigation into Be-
ing, to find much of value in his capacity 
to think deeply about human life, to 
struggle fruitfully with what he says 
about our loss of dwelling, and to appre-
ciate his massive and still unfolding con-
tribution to thought and to thinking, 
without looking for evidence of Nazism 
in every twist and turn of the philosophi-
cal path he lays down. (pp. 91-92) 
 
While the relationship between Heidegger’s 
philosophy and National Socialism will like-
ly remain controversial, his philosophical 
insights continue to influence the phenome-
nological project today. 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1900–2002. 
The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gad-
amer was a student of both Husserl and 
Heidegger (Moules, 2002).  His work is 
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known as philosophical hermeneutics, which 
is focused on understanding and interpreta-
tion rather than methodology (Moules, 
2002).  Key themes in Gadamer’s philo-
sophical hermeneutics include methodology 
and the human sciences, language and con-
versation, understanding and application, 
history, and the restoration of prejudice 
(Grondin, 1991/1994, Moules, 2002). 
 
Methodology and the human sciences. 
Gadamer questioned whether acquisition of 
methods unique to the human sciences was a 
necessary prerequisite to the human sciences 
securing legitimate science status, and even 
whether methodology could be the sole arbi-
ter of validity (Grondin, 1991/1994). The 
hermeneutic task in relation to the human 
sciences is therefore not to develop a meth-
odology for correct interpretation, but to 
“demonstrate the untenability of the idea of 
universally valid knowledge” (Grondin, 
1991/1994, p. 107). The human sciences 
deal with a different type of truth than the 
natural sciences, and are better suited to a 
humanistic discourse than is the methodo-
logical, objectifying discourse of the natural 
sciences (Grondin, 1991/1994). Moules 
(2002) described Gadamer’s interpretation 
of truth as “the event of meaning, rather than 
something of objectivity of repetition. To 
say that we uncover truth in understanding 
simply means that we have found a mean-
ingful account that corresponds to experi-
ence” (p. 11). 
 
Language and dialogue. Language oc-
cupies a central place in Gadamer’s philo-
sophical hermeneutics. Gadamer asserted 
that understanding is not something pos-
sessed by the individual, but rather some-
thing that emerges through participation in 
“meaning, tradition, and ultimately a dia-
logue” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 119). For 
Gadamer, language and interpretation in the 
human sciences are understood in a dialogi-
cal, question-and-response framework be-
cause “to understand a text or an event is to 
understand it as a reply to a question” 
(Grondin, 1999/2003, p. 125). Here Gada-
mer returns to Augustine’s delimitations of 
propositional language, in comparison to the 
greater expressive potential of language em-
bedded in the dialogical process.   
 
Gadamer devoted significant space in his 
writing to reflecting on the nature of true 
conversation, both in form and purpose. 
Genuine conversation, to Gadamer, does not 
involve competing for the supremacy of 
one’s opinion; likewise, it is not a summa-
tive process in which one viewpoint is added 
to another (Gadamer, 1970/2007). The focus 
of genuine conversation remains on the topic, 
and the conversational partners hold this 
topic in common (Gadamer 1970/2007). For 
Gadamer, “genuine conversation transforms 
the viewpoint of both. . . . [and] involves the 
shared interpretation of the world which 
makes moral and social solidarity possible” 
(Gadamer, 1970/2007, p. 96). Exploring a 
topic with a conversational partner in order 
to come to a better understanding of that 
topic’s meaning has been taken up as an in-
terviewing strategy in hermeneutic phenom-
enology along with more traditional strate-
gies aimed at soliciting experiential accounts 
(van Manen, 1990). 
 
Gadamer’s theory of fusion of horizons 
relates to both the expansion of understand-
ing that emerges between dialogical partners 
in genuine conversation and the enlargement 
of knowledge that arises when an interpreter 
interacts with a text. In each case, each party 
(whether a person or a text) possesses its 
own horizon of understanding, and in a fu-
sion of horizons, they merge to create a new, 
more expansive understanding of the topic 
(Gadamer, 1977/2007). Gadamer’s fusion of 
horizons has important implications for in-
terpretive interviewers, because it suggests 
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the greatest knowledge will be created when 
both parties in a conversation actively con-
tribute to creating meaning, rather than 
when the interviewer assumes an objective 
stance so as not to “taint” the findings or 
influence the interviewee. 
 
Understanding and application. Rather 
than approaching interpretation as a purely 
epistemological or intellectual pursuit, and 
application of interpretation as occurring 
after the fact (e.g., jurisprudence), Gadamer 
conceptualized “understanding and applica-
tion as indivisibly fused” (Grondin, 
1991/1994, p. 115). Understanding always 
involves “applying a meaning to our situa-
tion, to the questions we want answered” 
(Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 115).  Central to the 
act of interpretation is the application of a 
past text or event to the present (Grondin, 
1999/2003), an application that is influenced 
by tradition, history, and custom-so that ap-
plication becomes an extension of the dia-
logical search for meaning that precedes the 
interpreter (Grondin, 1991/1994).   
 
History. As human beings, Gadamer as-
serted, we are deeply rooted in history-or, as 
Grondin (1991/1994) explained, “we belong 
to history more than history belongs to us” 
(p. 116). This means that that our knowledge 
of history or even of our own historical de-
terminism is always less than the actual 
workings of history in our lives (Grondin, 
1999/2003). When writing about the role of 
history in interpretation, Gadamer used the 
German word Wirkungsgeschichte, a word 
that has proven difficult to translate into 
English (Grondin 1999/2003). Grondin 
(1999/2003) defended “the work of history” 
as the best translation-“the notion of work 
gives us a better idea that history is active in 
us, works in us or penetrates us, to a greater 
extent than knowledge can penetrate and 
suspect” (p. 92).   
 
In the human sciences, one of Gada-
mer’s principles of the work of history in-
volves the historiography of the topic 
(Grondin, 1999/2003). Every topic or re-
search question, no matter how seemingly 
novel, is part of a larger history of interpre-
tation-“a subject, a problematic, an interro-
gation will always be inscribed in a tradition, 
in a debate, of which we must take note” 
(Grondin, 1999/2003, p. 93). The presenta-
tion of the historiography of a topic is com-
mon practice in the human sciences, usually 
taking the form of a review of literature 
leading to the research question (Grondin, 
1999/2003). 
 
Prejudice. Gadamer argued for the idea 
of prejudice to be restored to its pre-
Enlightenment meaning, before it acquired 
the negative associations it carries today - 
that of erroneous, unjustified beliefs (Gada-
mer, 1965/2007). In Gadamer’s view, “prej-
udices are biases of our openness to the 
world. They are simply conditions whereby 
we experience something - whereby what 
we encounter says something to us” (Gada-
mer, 1965/2007, p. 82). Gadamer captured 
the importance of this concept by saying, “it 
is not so much our judgments as it is our 
prejudices that constitute our being” (Gada-
mer, 1965/2007, p. 82). This insight is fertile 
for understanding hermeneutic phenomenol-
ogy - the researcher’s ability to attend to a 
phenomenon and draw conclusions about it 
will necessarily be mediated by his or her 
prejudices (or pre-judgments). Consider, for 
example, a hermeneutic phenomenologist 
studying anxiety - how would he or she 
know to inquire about the embodied experi-
ence of anxiety unless he or she had prior 
knowledge (prejudices) concerning anxiety 
and physical symptoms?  In this way, our 
prejudices will always shape our judgments. 
 
Jean-Paul Sartre, 1905-1980. The 
French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre contin-
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ued Heidegger’s project of existential phe-
nomenology, emphasizing our self-
consciousness and drive for meaning, which 
is expressed actively in the world through 
our projects (Smith et al., 2009); Sartre’s 
persistent concern with our being-in-the 
world (Dasein) as mediated through our 
practical concerns (i.e., our projects) contin-
ued Heidegger’s pragmatic philosophical 
approach to human experience (Flynn, 2011). 
A few key components of Sartre’s philoso-
phy are particularly informative for the her-
meneutic phenomenological project: human 
concern for becoming over being, nothing-
ness, the direction of perception, and free-
dom (Smith et al., 2009).   
 
Concern for becoming over being. For 
Sartre, human beings are preoccupied with 
our potential future selves, what Smith et al. 
(2009) describe as “concern with what we 
will be, rather than what we are” (p. 19). 
Human beings are constantly in process, and 
“the self is not a pre-existing unity to be dis-
covered, but an ongoing project to be un-
furled” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 19). The her-
meneutic phenomenologist is concerned 
with the projects taken on by human actors - 
projects that are “embodied, interpersonal, 
affective and moral” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 
21). 
 
Nothingness. Sartre, reminiscent of 
Heidegger’s visible and invisible in the ap-
pearance of phenomena, was concerned with 
what he called nothingness, that is, the equal 
importance of what is absent with what is 
present in “defining who we are and how we 
see the world” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 19). If 
we are equally defined by the absent in exis-
tential phenomenology, the phenomenolo-
gist must consider what might be missing 
from any account of experience. For exam-
ple, is belongingness what is absent in an 
account of loneliness?  
 
The direction of perception. We do not 
pursue our projects in a world that belongs 
only to us, and our relatedness to others 
shapes our perceptions of the world (Smith 
et al., 2009). The direction of perception is a 
dual process encompassing both how the 
world changes as we perceive others in it, 
and how it changes us as we perceive our-
selves being perceived within the world 
(Smith et al., 2009). Sartre’s extension of 
Heidegger’s concept of worldliness to in-
clude personal and social relationships, and 
of experience as “contingent upon the pres-
ence - and absence - of our relationships to 
other people . . . is perhaps the clearest 
glimpse of what a phenomenological analy-
sis of the human condition can look like” 
(Smith et al., 2009, p. 20). 
 
Freedom. Existentialism emphasizes the 
freedom and responsibility of human beings 
to choose what they will become, but this 
freedom is situated in the complex biograph-
ical and social content of individual action 
(Smith et al., 2009). Sartre’s freedom is a 
salient reminder that human beings are sub-
jects who actively interpret and construct the 
world (see also Mead, 1962). 
 
Social Work and  
Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
 
I encourage social work researchers to con-
sider hermeneutic phenomenology as an ap-
propriate methodology for knowledge build-
ing in the discipline. Several features of 
hermeneutic phenomenology seem especial-
ly suited to social work research, including 
its focus on inquiry as application, emphasis 
on the situated nature of human experiences, 
concept of attention to the unspoken or un-
disclosed, idea of the hermeneutic circle as a 
link between individual experiences and 
larger structures, fusion of horizons, and in-
clusion of the practitioner identity in re-
search activities. 
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Social work is an applied discipline with 
a focus on social justice, the pursuit of 
which is an obligation included in the Code 
of Ethics for Canadian social workers (Ca-
nadian Association of Social Workers, 2005). 
According to Davey (2006), “understanding 
does not merely interpret the world but 
changes it” (p. xiv). Therefore, it is appro-
priate to include a focus on praxis in inter-
pretation in social work research. Madison 
(1990) stated “a good understanding will be 
“suggestive” or fertile in that it raises ques-
tions that stimulate further research and in-
terpretation” (p. 30).  
 
Heidegger used the term Dasein (there-
being) to emphasize the profoundly situated 
nature of human experience and the relation-
ships and activities from which experience 
and meaning emerge (Smith et al., 2009). 
Social work is a highly situated endeavor, 
composed of a complex web of relational, 
structural, practical, and axiological con-
cerns; Heidegger’s Dasein is therefore a 
much more generative image for social work 
researchers than Husserl’s pre-reflective Le-
benswelt. Additionally, a hermeneutic ap-
proach allows engagement with participants 
in a meaningful way - clarifying, wondering, 
and trying out interpretations in a way that 
creates a broader horizon of understanding 
than a strictly objective approach.   
 
Utilizing a hermeneutic phenomenologi-
cal approach allows the social work re-
searcher to attend to what is unspoken, as 
well as what is spoken, and in doing so to 
invite the shadow side of social work back 
into the interpretation. Many experiences 
where social work is situated involve pain 
and shame, and are not easily talked about in 
the larger societal discourse - experiences 
such as trauma, mental health challenges, 
and abuse. Most social workers are skilled in 
listening for both what is not said about the-
se experiences as well as what is said - an 
approach that can be extended into research 
activities. 
 
Like social work, hermeneutic inquiry 
requires researchers to operate from a posi-
tion of closeness to, and great sympathy 
with, their research participants and, at a 
deeper level, their human conditions of 
which the (social worker) researcher is an 
acknowledged part. Detachment from clients 
may be a marker of burnout in social work-
ers, and a willingness to enter into clients’ 
life worlds in a way that eases pain and fa-
cilitates positive change is required of social 
workers. Entering with clients this way, of-
ten acting as a witness to both the darkest 
and most life-giving experiences of human 
life, changes the social worker in some very 
fundamental way. The committed social 
worker will enter again, and again, and 
again into these places, coming out each 
time as someone at least slightly changed. 
As social workers and clients bring their 
personal and practice experiences to each 
encounter, so too are they changed by each 
other - a hermeneutic circle. Social workers 
bring all of their humanness to their work 
with clients. The social worker’s own hu-
manity is the foundation of all he or she will 
achieve as a helper, advocate, and witness.   
 
Social constructionist perspectives, 
which are consistent with hermeneutic in-
quiry, recognize the socially constructed na-
ture of reality and the inter-subjectivity of 
knowledge. The inter-subjectivity of the so-
cial worker and client is mirrored in the in-
ter-subjectivity of researcher and participant. 
This “fusion of horizons,” as expressed by 
Gadamer, refers to the fluid meanings, ideas, 
and experiences of participants, which are 
situated in a changing historical context 
(Lopez & Willis, 2004). Much of social 
work practice, whether in a clinical, com-
munity, or educational contexts, is con-
cerned with making sense of, and often 
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transforming, painful social experiences (i.e., 
disrupting oppressive discourses). The her-
meneutic approach extends these sense-
making activities to the research realm. Co-
creation of meaning is central to this ap-
proach. Action is at the heart of social work 
- social work is an applied discipline fo-
cused on change. In order for real change to 
happen, we must first create a different set 
of meanings about the situations we find 
ourselves in, and then take action to trans-
form those situations. Some narratives are 
more limiting than others, and social work-
ers work with clients and the public to ques-
tion limiting narratives and co-create new 
ways of understanding private troubles and 
public issues. As clients may be changed by 
their work with social workers, so too are 
social workers changed, often irrevocably, 
by their work with clients. 
 
The social worker, forging yet another 
professional identity as a researcher, cannot 
and should not shed the earlier practitioner 
self. The emergence of the novice social 
work researcher is another interpretative 
process in the web of self and profession, in 
which it is not enough to acquire technical 
competence. Rather, the novice researcher is 
called to explore the values of their work 
and the values of the research endeavor to 
arrive at a beginning place of congruence 
and commitment. Once again, a new self 
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